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sian emerging markets, while coming out of defiantly anti-market traditions, 
have increasingly embraced policies of competitive advantage as crucial to 
vibrant economic growth.   In the post-communist economies of China and 
Kazakhstan, local economies have contributed to sustainable yet diversified 
growth in an era where the future recurrence of economic crisis, both in emerging and 
mature markets, is uncertain. Emerging markets, like developed economies in the West, 
have turned to inter-regional competition, spurred on by local economies and business-
industrial clusters, as internal growth engines to power up national economies. Whether 
generated from bottom-up commercial growth or top-led government growth, post-
command economies of Asia, despite their semi-authoritarian bent, advocate inter- and 
intra-regional competition. Local economic growth is seen as a means of contributing to 
overall economic diversification and creating technical, business, and knowledge 
spillover.  Yet promotion of diversified regional economies also poses challenges for 
Asian state capitalisms that prize state interventionism over commercial solutions.  
  
Transitional economies, such as China and Kazakhstan, aim to activate and sustain 
nationwide growth by supporting competition within and between multiple industries 
and regions.  Yet these Asian state capitalisms are exceedingly wary of implicit lines of 
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fragmentation that may come to the fore as regions and sectors compete with one 
another for prominence, access to government subsidies, and, most importantly, foreign 
investment. The political and economic risk of uneven development, as regions jockey 
for power and position, may compromise overall national stability and fracture into 
competing factionalisms, particularly if economic growth becomes constrained.  Still, 
for these Asian emerging markets, creating and sustaining dynamic centers of regional 
innovation and industry is seen as key to achieving diversified national growth and 
leveling the playing field of long-term economic development. 
 
China and Kazakhstan: Emerging Market Neighbors  
 
In the first decade of the 21st century, the post-communist emerging markets of 
Kazakhstan and China defied expectations and anti-market origins by generating strong 
GDP growth.   While China’s economy has been slowing in 2012, its projected growth 
scenarios have earlier clocked in at the high single digits.  In 2001, Kazakhstan’s GDP 
galloped into the double digits at 13.5%.   After dipping down later in the decade, the 
country’s economic growth still exhibited a respectable upward growth scenario, over 
7% in 2010 and 2011, countering trends in faltering Western economies.   
 
In addition to growth stories that defy an anti-market past, the neighboring emerging 
markets of China and Kazakhstan also share other characteristics.   Both states continue 
to incorporate legacies of a Marxist-Leninism past in their economic present, if with 
different institutional implications.  The shared Eurasian borders of the two states span a 
contiguous landmass rich in subsurface wealth: natural and mineral resources that 
support oil, gas, and metallurgy industries.   
 
The two Asian emerging markets also share state-building legacies that predated 
communism, legacies that grew out of the necessity of controlling and administering 
large territorial expanses of agricultural land along their respective frontiers.  As early 
the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE - 24 AD), China penetrated into Central Asia and 
Eurasian territory.  Kazakhstan’s statehood emerged out of the expansion of the Russian 
and later Soviet empire into Siberia and central Asia.  The sheer scope and variety of 
both China’s and Kazakhstan’s territories and sub-regions presents both challenges and 
possibilities for future state integration scenarios.  
 
Creating Competitive Advantage: Local Economies and Business-Industrial 
Clusters in China and Kazakhstan 
 
Despite the divide between dirigiste East and non-interventionist West, the model of 
boosting competition within and between local economies has gained followers on both 
sides of the statist vs. free market divide.  Emerging markets and mature economies 
alike have turned to regional economic development, in particular the development of 
business-industrial clusters, as a means to energize state growth.   In the Competitive 
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Advantage of Nations (1998), Michael Porter of Harvard Business School famously 
proposed the creation of multiple commercial clusters as a means to enhance overall 
national growth.  The economics of agglomeration, discussed by Paul Krugman (1991) 
and Alfred Marshall in the 19th century, looked to centers of business-industrial 
concentration as a means to generate further growth and enhance competitive 
performance and spillover.   In this model, as sub-regional economies differentiate, they 
branch out into networks of influence that, in turn, generate additional nerve-centers of 
economic activity. 
  
In the last few decades, both Western and Asian capitalisms have institutionalized 
business-industrial clusters, whether organic growth centers or special economic zones, 
as a means to engage local and national economic development in tandem.  Whether 
adopted by agro-zone, industrial park, or inner city enclave, complementary business-
and-distribution networks ideally create spillovers that amplify productivity in 
neighboring regions.    As original clusters mature, they may become launching pads for 
derivative clusters outside of immediate geographic networks.   
 
The business-industry clusters inaugurated by young Asian capitalisms such as 
Kazakhstan and China aim to tap into the dynamics of competitive overflow, while 
creating new competencies.  However, these emerging Asian economies also try to 
reign in fragmentation that may arise from potentially contradictory trends exposed by 
local economies, to compromise overall state integration.  Contradictory impulses of 
localized growth, with regions competing among themselves, may generate new 
opportunities for overall development.  But regional differences, exposing emerging 
asset and wealth gaps, may also set in motion social and economic disequilibrium that 
both states seek to contain.  The risk remains that the periphery may become polarized, 
if disjunctures between competing commercial-industrial centers are unresolved, and if 
regional inequalities create lines of division rather than spillover-effect.  China and 
Kazakhstan both contend with such challenges as they attempt to launch growth centers 
in their own regional peripheries in particular.  
 
Frontier Markets Join the Emerging Marketplace  
 
As emerging markets such as China become more closely aligned with global market 
trends, new players have emerged as new kids on the block.  These peripheral states are 
not yet global forces to be contended with.  Yet they, and their disparate brethren across 
Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, present global markets with a new 
cast of characters, along with new growth and investment opportunity, in a global 
economy where the fate of mature markets is uncertain.  Meanwhile, emerging market 
countries such as China are now sufficiently high-stakes players in the global economy 
that they exceed the limitations of the term “emerging market”.  According to Jim 
O’Neill, Head of Global Asset Management at Goldman Sachs and originator of the 
term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), “emerging markets” are perhaps more 
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accurately deemed “growing markets”.   Given that China, for one, vies with the US and 
Europe in its ability to impact trends and contours of the global marketplace, the impact 
of its economic decision-making reaches far beyond national borders: “The world is 
new, and the countries driving it are not ones of past generations.”    
   
As emerging markets mature, global finance -- ever in search of new opportunities for 
capital creation -- seeks out new sources of investment, growth, speculation, and hedge 
opportunity.  Frontier markets, considered by many global investors to be a subset of 
emerging markets, combine relative openness and relative degrees of political stability 
with greater growth opportunity than “classic” emerging markets, albeit with the 
downside of greater risk.  As young states in Asia and elsewhere enter the high-profile 
stakes of the global economy, they have offer investment alternatives to global financial 
markets weary of the uncertain returns of domestic “exotic instruments” (namely 
mortgage CDOs, which famously turned toxic in 2008).  For those intrepid investors 
seeking to diversify options for financial gain, the frontier markets, Kazakhstan among 
them, offer uniquely diversified opportunities for market exposure.  As BlackRock’s 
website puts it, these markets provide “a logical extension to the global equity 
universe.”   In addition to low correlations between mature and immature markets, these 
“locally driven economies also offer opportunities for early-stage investment in fast-
growing economies,” opportunities rare in maturing markets: US, European, and, 
increasingly, China.  However, the frontier markets themselves naturally seek to 
manage their own financial and economic destinies apart from the role that Western 
investors would have them play. 
  
Regionalism in Kazakhstan and Business-Industrial Clusters 
 
Kazakhstan’s relative isolation from global markets shielded it from the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-8, and this reminds the government that integrating into the global 
economy on the terms of the mature markets is not invariably an advantage.  From its 
own vantage point, Kazakhstan wants to avoid the domination of any one set of global 
economic arbiters defining the terms on which it enters the global economic stage.   
Eager to abandon the stigma of frontier status, Kazakhstan’s government seeks to define 
itself not as an outlier or laggard, but as epicenter of Eurasia. While Kazakhstan 
ultimately seeks influence and, inevitably, integration into the larger schema of global 
capital markets, the state’s priority is to grow a stable real economy from the inside out, 
while reversing its former frontier status at the edge of Russia.   
 
Despite Kazakhstan government’s desire to position itself as epicenter of Eurasia, its 
economic geography as landlocked state impedes this development.  In addition, a 
crumbling heavy industrial infrastructure, inherited from the Soviet era, demands costly 
reinvestment across expansive territory.  In the past, fragmented logistics were built to 
bifurcate Kazakhstan’s productive landscape: during the Soviet Union, western 
Kazakhstan’s crude oil transport systems were connected to Russia, so as to be 
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processed across the border. Meanwhile, energy supplies in eastern Kazakhstan had 
depended on Russian inflow. Eastern and western Kazakhstan, geographically disparate, 
became further disconnected by design.   
 
Northern Kazakhstan (with the industrial centers of Pavlodar and Karaganda) is 
contiguous with the territorial-industrial-logistics zone of southern Siberian Russia.  
Industrial supply chains, as well as informal inter-governmental and business relations, 
continue to connect northern Kazakhstan closely to its northern neighbor.  By contrast, 
southern Kazakhstan, with its desert-zones interspersed by oasis towns, has been closely 
affiliated with southern central Asian economies such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in 
terms of irrigation-based agriculture and hydroelectric systems.  To the far west of state, 
adjacent to the Caspian, lies the most precious resource of all, oil – a third of a continent 
away from the more populous centers of eastern Kazakhstan. To the far southeast stands 
the former capital of Almaty (former Verney, later Alma-Ata), originally established as 
a Russian frontier post.  Almaty was positioned at the end of the line of a long series of 
garrison towns that mapped out the expansion of Russian empire into southern Siberia 
and central Asia, acting as a zone of containment and control to mark out agrarian 
settlement and constrain nomadic territory. Such a fragmentary landscape, which 
reinforces internal geographic disparities, continues to challenge the logistics of the 
state, which impede evenly developed economic growth. 
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan’s government looked to the success 
stories of East Asia on which to pattern economic and business development and trade.  
The state moniker “Snow Leopard” was chosen by the government to join the 
formidable line-up of the successful “Asian tigers”.  Unlike the East Asian economies, 
however, Kazakhstan was bound by land-locked limitations without access to the 
Pacific trade routes that defined export-led growth of the East Asian success story.   
Kazakhstan business and government leaders admired the East Asian developmental 
states, with their close relationships between large corporate conglomerates -- Korea 
with its chaebol and early Japan in its kereitsu stage. Singapore, embracing semi-
authoritarian government along with a successful sovereign wealth fund, served as an 
important model for strong state control coupled with commercial success.   
 
In order not to be defined by the limitations of a commodity-extraction state, 
Kazakhstan’s government has sought to create multiple sources of revenue from 
diversified external and internal sources.  It aimed to bypass the boom and bust cycles 
of a resource-dependent state (resource curse or “Dutch disease”) by accessing multiple 
channels of revenue generation.  In the early 2000s, Kazakhstan’s government planned 
to launch business-industrial clusters as a means to create competitive local economies, 
industries, and sectors.  
 
To focus on regional economies as potentially disparate sources of foreign investment 
revenue beyond the booming oil-gas sector, in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
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Kazakhstan’s state investment bureau published marketing materials explicating the 
resources and industries of multiple regions of Kazakhstan: from phosphates to 
pharmaceuticals, gold to grain, construction to chemicals.  While the unpredictable 
markets for oil and gas might create intermittent risk for Kazakhstan’s future, 
investment in multiple industries and regions would harbor more stable sources of 
security through economic diversification.  
 
In efforts to strengthen and further diversify regional economies, in 2005 the 
government of Kazakhstan invited Michael Porter, business strategy expert of Harvard 
Business School’s Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, to advise on the creation 
of business-industrial clusters.  Along with the consultancy J.E. Austin, the Kazakhstan 
cluster-project proposed initial templates for broadening and deepening economic 
diversity through multiple growth clusters.   In twelve regions, Kazakhstan’s 
government and business planners, along with advisors, selected 55,000 enterprises for 
study.  Seven sectors were identified as best prepared to support commercial and 
industrial cluster growth:  food-processing, textile manufacture, transportation logistics, 
tourism, metallurgy, construction materials, and last not least, oil-and-gas machine 
building.  By 2012, in later policy iterations, other industries were added as emerging 
priorities: biotechnology, IT, alternative energy, atomic power, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.   
 
In order to diversity away from the former predominance of heavy-industry prioritized 
by Soviet era growth, the development of light industry was conceived as a means to 
approximate the competitiveness of the East Asian economies.  China had profited by 
its ability to translate light industry into nanotechnology and other small-scale 
manufacturing venues.  Similarly, Kazakhstan likewise hoped to create more centers of 
small-scale manufacturing to promote export-led growth from multiple centers.   For 
example, “Ontustyk Special Economic Zone,” scheduled for completion in 2015, aims 
to rejuvenate one the few islands of light industry where Soviet Union had not neglected 
regional core competencies:  namely, the textile and weaving industry indigenous to 
southern Central Asia.  
  
In 2010, investment in light industry shot up from negative numbers in 2008 to 11 
million.   In other areas of western Kazakhstan, to offset the singular domination of the 
oil industry, a project for the creation of an automated fishing complex for sturgeon-
farming was initiated.  In northern Kazakhstan, manufacturing facilities for potash were 
implemented, while in the south phosphorus and nitrogen-phosphorus industrial zones 
were targeted for development.   A wide range of multiple manufacturing facilities and 
commercial ventures were instituted, from rare metals extraction to tourism and 
hospitality, adding to the spectrum of regional diversification across the state.  
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Balancing Center and Periphery: The Challenges of Cluster Creation  
 
However, despite the ambitious diversification program, the continued priorities of 
diverting resources to the state center compromise the project of building out multiple 
centers of economic productivity and business clusters.   An OECD (2011) report 
examining the impediments to diversified growth in Kazakhstan noted the relative 
absence of sufficient infrastructure and financing to support further supply-chain 
networks.  The uneven distribution of resource wealth in the west, compared to 
relatively resource-poor regions in the south, continues to perpetuate regional disparities 
and resentments. On the one hand, poorer regions in the southern Kazakhstan rely on 
the center to support and finance growth projects (Cummings, 2005).   Poorer regions 
feel abandoned by the increased concentration of wealth in Astana, the new center of 
elite glitterati on the formerly windswept center of the steppe. At the same time, the 
western regions of Kazakhstan, astride the bulk of subterranean wealth, seek to have 
greater say in how regional wealth is utilized and allocated, including access to foreign 
investment projects which continue invest primarily in the oil-and-gas sector. 
 
In December 2011, deliberately coinciding with Kazakhstan’s Independence Day, 
striking workers in the oil-producing western region of Mangistau led riots which 
claimed 14 fatalities and over 80 injuries, as striking oil-industry workers clashed with 
police over labor disputes (Rudnitsky, 2011).  While the underlying origins and 
outcome of the rebellion remain uncertain, the message learned by the government is 
clear.  Central government management of resources takes precedence over prioritizing 
regional growth, if restive regional fragmentation is to be the outcome.  Earlier in the 
decade, government leadership accomplished the goal of establishing a symbolic 
geographic center.  The new capital of Astana, positioned more closely to the territorial 
center of the state, reverses the peripheral place of the former capital of Almaty, as 
outpost of the former Russian frontier.  
 
Still, although Kazakhstan’s government has repositioned an illustrious new capital 
closer to state center, the goal of Kazakhstan as economic epicenter of Eurasia remains 
elusive.   The landlocked status of the state continues to contribute to logistics and trade 
difficulties that its neighbor of China, facing the Pacific, has largely overcome.   No 
longer at the behest of Russia, however, Kazakhstan’s political economy will look to 
the maturing emerging market of China to finance internal infrastructure and engage in 
mutually cooperative ventures, in order to more closely consolidate its own goal of 
economic pivot of Eurasia.  
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Formation of Proto-Clusters of Business and Industry in China: 
From Soviet-Style Centralization to Maoist Fragmentation 
  
In creating a policy of economic diversification and competitive economic development 
that bridges state-led growth with commercial advantage, China shares with Kazakhstan 
an expansive geography inflected by a Marxist-Leninist past and, previously, traditions 
of state-building that emphasized control over large and often diverse regions.  Here 
too, policies that build up business-industrial clusters often reflect dueling legacies 
where top-down priorities compete with localized, bottom-up incentives.  In the case of 
Kazakhstan, the lingering frontier legacy, coupled with the desire for centralized 
management that previously eluded it in the Soviet era, have combined to create an 
economy complicated by mixed messages to its regional governments, not to mention 
the country’s populace and the global community at large.  In China, divergent 
institutional tendencies – namely, the tension between centralization and 
decentralization – complicate a range of financial (Shih, 2009) and economic policy 
choices and decisions (Zheng, 2007).  The inconsistent paradigms between top-down 
centralized control and bottom-up economic diversity complicate the process of 
building up competitive localized clusters of business and industrial enterprise.  And 
these inconsistencies, in the view of Asian governments, justify strong state 
interventionism, particularly where economic gaps throw off the goal of overall growth.  
 
Recent literature of state capitalism has tended to focus on the uniform directives as 
operating from a single, tightly-orchestrated center.  However, in the case of 
Kazakhstan, alternating currents of decentralization and centralization (Cummings, 
2005) have complicated economic decision-making within the regime. In China, a 
single set of quasi-authoritarian directives belies the sub-surface complexity of regional 
diversity.   Yet such institutional gaps may also allow for the flexibility of negotiating, 
bargaining (Tsai, 2007), and creative experimentation (Pascha, et al., 2011) as low-risk 
alternatives are tested out before being transposed unto larger templates of region, 
province, and state (Zheng, 2007). As economic experiments involving small-scale 
ventures proceed by trial and error, they impact the formation of larger-scale state 
direction and directives. The evolution of competing regionalisms in China exposes 
potential fragmentation but also contributes to ongoing innovations that arise out of 
layering and negotiating different business and economic paradigms.  
   
In the Chinese market, two divergent institutional legacies can be identified to impact 
policies of regional economic growth and business-industrial cluster-building and 
economic agglomeration.  One pattern, a top-down, government led growth model 
prioritizes central management of large-scale industry.  This schema depends on the 
concentration of state financing to target strategic industry, including centralized 
support of heavy industrial manufacturing, logistics, and project finance.   The other 
model, a more organic patchwork of individuated micro-regions, grows out of small-
scale commerce and trade.   The first pattern is more prevalent in northern and western 
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China, where vast territorial expanse, Soviet influence on large-scale industry, and 
military-agricultural traditions of state-building prefigured top-down government 
intervention.  The second pattern, closely identified with southern and eastern China, 
favored more individualized, small-scale commercial zones, where dense population 
and diversified light industry predominated.   
 
The centralizing legacy of China’s business-industrial development harkens back to a 
previous Leninist program of state industrial policy, but also leads toward East Asian 
state-development models that favor close interaction between strategic corporations 
and government.   By contrast, the atomistic tendency and the prioritization of local 
economies, which set the stage for bottom-up business growth clusters, grew out of a 
Maoist predilection for micro-regionalisms.  
  
In the middle decades of the 20th century, for a China eager to bypass an entrenched 
agrarian past and embrace large-scale industrialization, the Soviet Union represented 
the apex of achievement:  heavy industry, logistics, and centrally-coordinated 
technology.  The Soviet ability to centrally manage large territories, as well as small-
scale data management (Huang, 1994) alike proved an inspiration to communist China.   
By the 1950s, the Soviet Union was already creating incipient computerized systems of 
input-output to collect the dizzying array of data derived from the center, as well as 
multiple regional peripheries.    
 
Further, the Soviet Union’s system of managing disparate regional entities also made its 
mark on China’s emerging political economy, namely, on the Chinese frontier zone 
adjacent to the Soviet border.  China designated its “new frontier” (Xinjiang) as the 
“Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” patterning itself after the Soviet program 
naming regional Central Asian peripheries according to titular nationalities: Kazakh, 
Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.s).   In the former 
Soviet Union, such strategies conveyed paradoxical messages of control and 
concession, ultimately setting in place perimeters for eventual fragmentation into 
disparate state entities.  In China, while this scenario is unlikely, alternate and 
coexisting trends of concession and containment continue to impact differential 
economic development of business and industry along China’s western frontier. 
 
The differential development of western vs. eastern China in the 20th century was in 
part influenced by several conditions: 1) western (and northern) China’s relative 
proximity to Soviet large scale industrial projects and policy zones, compared to 
southeastern China’s proximity to Pacific commercial routes and Chinese diaspora 
states; 2) large territorial regions of low population density, along with multi-national 
populations, overlapping both Soviet Central Asia and western China; 3) shared 
priorities of border control and frontier management that characterized previous 
traditions of state-expansion (imperial Russia and China) and, 4) last but not least, the 
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importance of subsurface assets of hydrocarbon wealth and minerals shared by both 
western China and Soviet Eurasia.  
 
Despite these shared prioritizes, by the late 1950s and 60s China’s ability to internalize 
a centralized program of heavy industry, as well as the Soviet Union’s capacity to 
continuously manage such projects, became formidable (Sachs and Woo, 1994).  Not 
only was continuous reinvestment in heavy industry costly and hard to maintain, but the 
programs of centralized technology and data-management also overburdened the state 
center (Huang, 1994).   The Chinese state, by necessity as well as design, returned to its 
own grass roots, literally and figuratively.  China became increasingly preoccupied by 
the far more basic concerns of food security (Meisner, 1982).  Maoist campaigns 
increasingly championed a return to the land: small-scale agriculture, light industry, and 
radically downsized communes. 
 
Increasingly distancing Chinese policy from Soviet-style industrial centralization, Mao 
prioritized localized economies as the template for economic vitality and growth:  
 
We cannot follow the Soviet Union, centralizing everything and leaving no way 
for the localities…We need unity, but we also need particularity….[E]very 
locality has to have a particularity suitable for its own conditions.  Such 
“particularity” is needed for the interests and the unity of the entire country 
(Mao, 1977:271, 275, cited in Zheng, 1977: 360).  
   
While in western China some state collectives retained their sprawling Soviet 
dimensions (Wiemer, 2004), in eastern China downscaled communes focused on micro-
units of patchwork productivity.  As the Chinese center was preoccupied with 
maintaining its own internal administrative and fiscal organs, it increasingly ceded 
management of agriculture and light industry to the regions and localities.   Radical 
experiments such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and Cultural Revolution (1966-
76) resulted in trauma to the state and regions that went far beyond the ill-fated 
experiments of the backyard furnaces.  
  
Still, despite intermittent systemic chaos, the downscaled commune system of the 1960s 
also tapped into what would prove to be a formidable advantage for eastern China: the 
diversified lattice-work of village-market towns that undergirded the redefined 
commune systems linking local economies to larger networks of trade (Skinner, 1963, 
1964).  In abandoning the large-scale Soviet models of centralized industry and vast 
mechanized state firms, the Chinese economy lost the initial advantage of technological 
performance.   But because of this disadvantage, Chinese regional economies were able 
to avail themselves of small-scale regional economies and economic decentralization 
that was later to form the impetus for competitive local economies in eastern China. 
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The Proliferation of Proto-Commercial Clusters in Eastern and Southern China 
 
In eastern and southern China local economies supported differentiated micro-regions 
generating a variety of business, commercial, and industrial enterprises.  In the 
patchwork economies of these regions, highly individuated organic growth clusters 
emerged out of unique proclivities adopted to local conditions.   According to Daniel 
Bell, in his discussion of “What Europe Can Learn From China,”  (The New York 
Times, Jan. 7, 2012), local economic diversity of Europe can be compared to the 
intricate China’s regional diversification, where centuries-old localities developed 
specific products and markets.  For instance, guilds such those of Nuremburg, based on 
village market-towns, competed as centers of craftsmanship with other neighboring 
German medieval and Renaissance towns.  They formed regional trade networks that 
became way stations along more comprehensive trade routes.   
   
For instance, by the 1980s, the Yangzte River Delta zone and Pearl River Delta region, 
supported micro- and macro-clusters that availed themselves of circuits of local industry 
that dated back centuries. For instance, the origins of the Wenzhou footwear cluster in 
Zhejiang province date to the fifth century A.D., while the textile and silk 
manufacturing industry of Xiqiao (Guangzhou province) began in the Tang dynasty 
(618-907 AD) (Zeng, 2010: 27). Eastern and southern China networks of market towns 
further tapped into the trading corridors centered upon flourishing port-cities, from 
Shanghai and Tianjin to Guangzhou and Hong Kong.  
 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, specialized communes, many of them based on traditions 
of regional cottage industry, created new small-scale enterprises, whether devoted to 
Dragon Well Tea or plastic toothbrushes.  By the early 1980s, a two-track pricing 
system allowed small-scale markets to revive, as village-communes sold surplus goods 
after satisfying state quotas.  In order to access export-led growth, communes marketed 
artisanal wares and small-scale light industrial goods at commune showrooms and 
Friendship Stores.  Kitten-chasing-butterfly embroidery and Great Wall carved folding 
screens were test-marketed to foreign commercial vendors, primarily diaspora trade and 
investment from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan.  Different regional 
provinces from the early 1980s actively courted potential foreign investors from the 
near abroad, competitively differentiating their own regional platforms.   In the 
concentric circles of commerce proliferating around the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze 
River Delta, and the Tianjin port zone, micro-regions, macro-urban regions and, 
increasingly, Special Economic Zones facilitated a mutual spillover effect of trade and 
technology that helped to create a booming economy along China’s entire eastern 
seaboard.   
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The Formation of Special Economic Zones, Trade Zones, and Cluster-Growth in 
Eastern China 
 
In the contemporary eastern and southeastern China of the 2000s and beyond, special 
economic zones have interspersed to intensify production and innovation, creating 
second- and third-generations of development based on earlier commercial clusters.   
Whether designated as SEZs (special economic zones), FTZs (free trade zones), EPZs 
(export-processing zones), EDTZs (economic and technological zones), or HIDZs 
(high-tech industrial development zones), successive generations of competitive clusters 
have drawn upon the competencies of earlier organic clusters but also competed with 
them.   In turn, micro-regions that did not attain special economic status have often 
imitated “open cities” and established their own self-funded economic zones (Wang and 
Hu, 2010).   
 
To take advantage of spillovers, special economic zones have been established at a 
partial distance from traditional urban centers, such as Guangzhou, Shanghai and 
Tianjin, in order to create more extensive commercial corridors.  The location of the 
Shenzhen SEZ, originally a traditional fishing village, was selected by the government 
for two reasons:  1) the geographic advantage of proximity to Hong Kong, as well as 2) 
less resistance to institutional change (Zeng, 2010:57).   Similarly, the Binhai New Area 
was established at some distance to Tianjin city, the prominent 19th century port city of 
northeastern China, to enhance and expand industrial and commercial opportunity into 
the less-developed proximity.  
 
The combination of bottom-up and top-down initiatives allowed local governments to 
experiment with multi-stranded initiatives where lower-risk degrees of experimentation 
would have lesser impact on the larger economy, in case of failure.  Local 
municipalities were encouraged to compete head to head, without involving the central 
government.  Regional and local governments were provided with hard budget 
constraints, but also incentives to conduct their own economic policies and claim the 
residuals (Ahrens and Jünemann, 2011; Montinola et al., 1995).  Local economies 
essentially acted as entrepreneurs (Oi, 1999; Zheng, 2007), with risk decentralized and 
central government involvement minimized. Fine-tuned tax incentives were periodically 
modified according to region, industry, maturity, and exposure to business hardship 
(Zheng, 2007:156-7). Foreign investment tax rates generally capped at 15% for foreign 
investors for the first few years of operation.   Meanwhile, the role of local governments 
in R & D varied according to industry, location and condition.  
 
As multiple corridors of competition emerged and proliferated across eastern China, 
smaller competitors were forced to find new ways to advertise and seek market share, at 
times piggy-backing on their competitors.  For instance, the Ningbo region utilized the 
Shanghai 2010 Expo Website to remind visitors of its famous multi-industry trade fair.   
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In micro-cluster and macro-cluster alike, emerging expertise encouraged other 
entrepreneurial ventures – private, public, and public-private – to take risks in other 
sectors and industries beyond their current domains.   Multiple centers of green 
technology emerging in northern and southern China have competed to differentiate 
themselves, initiating relationships with regional clients, national competitors, or 
international vendors.  
 
Along China’s eastern seaboard, differential local economies have evolved to prioritize 
different types of competition.  In the “Wenzhou model” (southeastern Zhejiang 
province), intense, small-scale competition among individual or small-scale 
entrepreneurs predominates (Tsai, 2007).  The mid-scale enterprises of “Sunan model” 
more closely link local government with group entrepreneurship.  The Pearl River 
model prioritizes foreign investment as driver of competition (ibid.).  Compared to the 
government-driven economic models of the Chinese interior engaging the northern and 
western frontier, cluster development in eastern and southeast China mobilized bottom-
up enterprise as the primary driver of growth.   
 
The focus on light industry prevalent in eastern Chinese clusters, whether SEZs or 
organic growth clusters, allowed for a flexible transformation that quickly adjusted to 
varied degrees of small-scale experimentation.  Within a single regional cluster, 
diversification of local industry quickly developed into multiple, specialized niches of 
export-led growth. For instance, in the Tianjian region (northeast China port zone), 
original food-processing and medical equipment clusters established in the 1990s 
expanded into six technology clusters by 2007: electronic information (through joint 
ventures with Motorola, Panasonic, and Samsung); optical, mechanical, and electronic 
integration (Honeywell); biomedicine (Novo Nordisk and Smithkline Beecham); a new 
material cluster; a new energy cluster; a machinery cluster (Toyota); and an 
environmental protection cluster (Veolia Water and Vestas).  By 2007, Tianjin 
industrial clusters supported 11 incubators, 245 incubated enterprises, 27 engineering 
technology research centers, 45 R & D centers, and seven venture capital institutions.  
Regional enterprises engaged in bio-chip, membrane technology, electric automobile, 
stem cell, and nanometer technology research (Li et al., 2010: 94-96). 
 
With intensified local competition within and between localized clusters of China’s 
east, several degrees of expansion have gradually extended into China’s interior.  In 
addition to the “Big Four” first-tier cities  (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and 
Beijing), second-tier megacities have emerged along the eastern seaboard, as well as 
further into central China (Chongqing, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Xian). Third-tier cities, 
supporting a growing middle class, also appeared as satellites of eastern clusters (Tse, 
2010).  Finally, fourth-tier cities ushered the next wave of development into the western 
interior, with Lanzhou (Gansu), Baotou (Inner Mongolia) and Urumqi (Xinjiang) 
forming the “new wave” (ibid.).   
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However, despite the gradual penetration of economic growth into the interior, the 
persistent disparity of wealth between China’s east coast regions and its interior 
continues to pose challenges for the Chinese government. In 2000, the Chinese central 
government launched the “Develop the West” campaign, which has been followed by a 
series of incentives in the following decade including land reclamation, resource 
development, and educational initiatives.   In China’s coastal cities, ever-intensifying 
competition, along with increased costs of living and production, all mandate a push 
towards the west, but one that “leapfrogs” development at a more accelerated pace.  
While commercial clusters have amplified competition and led to a mature economy 
along China’s eastern seaboard, China’s government is concerned that its own internal 
western frontier is not keeping pace with heightened competition and commerce 
elsewhere in China.  
 
 
Initiating Business-Industrial Clusters on China’s Western Frontier 
 
As China’s government addresses the development of the western frontier, it encounters 
not only challenges of economic disparity, but also institutional discontinuities.  In 
China’s west, expansive territory, subterranean wealth, diverse populations (Han and 
non-Han Chinese), and last but not least, a different institutional landscape complicates 
the program of China’s state integration.   Earlier state-building trajectories begun in 
early imperial China, coupled with the later influence of the Soviet centralized state 
industry, reinforce a policy along China’s western front that places greater emphasis on 
top-down administrative-military management rather than bottom-up commercial 
expansion led by localities.  Further, these localities may be compromised by interests 
that have little to do with the overall aims of national integration.  
 
Beginning in the Western Han (206 BCE – 9 CE), as the tuntian system, and 
culminating in the Qing Dynasty (1644 - 1912), China’s policies of border control and 
frontier expansion prioritized the establishment of military containment reinforced by 
agrarian settlement.  China’s policy of consolidating large tracts of land across an 
expansive frontier resembled imperial Russia’s policy of establishing border controls 
along its own Eurasian frontier.  Much as Cossacks manned military fort towns in 
Siberian and Kazakh territory, in the 19th century and earlier, Han Chinese and Manchu 
border guards were responsible for land reclamation and border policing along China’s 
own Central Asian frontier.  The goals of maintaining public order among disparate 
populations, while engaging in land reclamation of less arable areas, much of it desert 
and pasture, led to the prioritization of boundary controls. 
    
The People’s Republic of China incorporated the Qing dynasty formula of frontier 
border-control to contain a potentially restive frontier zone, while reclaiming arable 
land for cultivation.  The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), 
combining agriculture settlement with policing, utilized Chinese lower-rank soldiers to 
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settle the area.   In contemporary western China, XPCC (bingtuan) military units took 
over responsibilities of trading, in the early 2000s becoming the second largest 
originator of trade and agriculture in the region after the government (Wiemer, 
2004:170).     
 
In China’s west, in contrast to the fertile east, desertification rendered arable land scarce 
but valuable.   In the westernmost province of Xinjiang, extensive desert expanse 
bifurcates much of the region’s vast interior, despite the underlying assets of oil, gas 
and minerals.  In northern Xinjiang, alpine steppe zones, industry towns, and the famed 
oasis town along the old northern Silk Route (Turfan) are separated by distance and 
desert from former oasis towns of a more southern branch of the former Silk Route 
(Kashgar and Khotan), far to the south and west of Xinjiang. Testaments to ancient 
trade routes are identifiable mainly underground: cave frescoes of merchants, courtiers, 
and monks of multi-ethnic origin.   Still, horticulture and cotton to the south, and 
livestock and dairy production in the north, in addition to hydrocarbon assets, promise 
productivity in multiple industries.  
 
Adding to the ranks of Han Chinese and former Manchu soldiers, in the mid-20th 
century and the following decades, Han Chinese have migrated into the western frontier 
for reasons ranging from government encouragement to new business opportunity.  As 
westward-bound Chinese moved into the frontier, they competed with the indigenous 
Muslim Uyghur population with commercial, government and agricultural 
opportunities. With the ongoing competition for jobs and a piece of the China growth 
story, wealth differentials in the western regions have the potential to take on ethnic, 
religious, or military complexion.     
  
In late 2010, according to a People’s Daily article, Chinese officials admitted that 
Xinjiang was still in a “fragile state” after conflicts that erupted a year later.  In July 
2009, official figures counted 197 people dead and 1,700 injured in one of the severest 
riots in Urumqi to erupt in decades.   In late February 2012, a Xinjiang-run state website 
announced further tension in the region, with 20 killed and reports of local Muslims 
attacking Han Chinese (Wong, 2012).   The goal of lessening income gaps in order to 
reduce socio-economic discord has amped up central government involvement.  
   
Aiming to eliminate the potential “seeds of unrest” arising from income and ethnic 
disparities, the central government has targeted measures that combine top-down 
incentive with bottom-up localized growth.  These measures are designed to accelerate 
economic growth while decreasing wealth disparities in the still lagging western 
regions.  One of the main potential growth generators is slated to be the creation of a 
special economic zone in western Xinjiang, transposing the measures of revenue 
generation from China’s successful eastern development model.  In 2010, the Chinese 
central government took on a bold move of establishing the Kashgar SEZ, scheduled for 
completion in 2016, as a regional isolate distant from other commercial or industrial 
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centers closer to the Chinese center.   A more likely location for cluster-creation might 
have been closer to the vicinity of Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital and an urban center closer 
to Beijing.  The frontier boomtown of Urumqi, established as a Han administrative city, 
hosts a diverse, multi-ethnic population (Han Chinese, Uyghur, Hui, Kazakh and other 
nationalities), arguably more open to institutional change. By comparison, Kashgar, a 
relative outpost in western Xinjiang, holds a majority Uyghur populace, with bazaars 
and mosques more reminiscent of Central Asia than Han China.    
 
In addition to the Kashgar special economic zone), micro-regional “islands” formerly 
designated as ethno-nationality enclaves are now developed as economic micro-niches 
for diversified industry.  The Kizelesu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture and Bayangol 
Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture were premised on a previous template of the Soviet 
design: multi-national micro-zones, with implicit divide-and-control considerations. In 
China, these ethnic-administrative territories have been repurposed as diversified 
experiments of eco-niches or specialty industrials: from fruit tree cultivation and nature 
preserves to mineral ore mining.   
   
In Xinjiang, micro-regional incentives are accompanied by large-scale, integrative 
development strategies.  The policy of managing vast tracts of land in the western 
regions is a high priority today, evidenced in capital construction and logistics projects.  
According to figures from 2000, the central government dominates investment in the 
capital construction projects of Xinjiang, accounting for 60% of regional investment.  
This contrasts with a far lesser involvement in the rest of China, at 32% (Wiemer, 2004: 
175).  In 2000, the state share in the value of Xinjiang’s gross industrial output came to 
77%, with the national figure of the rest of China far lower at 47% (ibid.).  
 
A top priority of heavy industry and infrastructure projects in China’s far west is aimed 
at unifying and consolidating the northern and southern parts of the vast Xinjiang 
region, divided by the geography of desert expanse (Taklamakan) into bifurcated sub-
alpine and southern oasis zones.   The increased integration of the formerly fragmented 
province also links up to infrastructure and logistics projects across China, with 
disparate western regions connecting to networks of pipeline, rail and highway leading 
to eastern China.   More than eight national highways, 66 inter-provincial highways, 
and more than 600 county level roads crisscross Xinjiang, with industrial efforts 
ranging from energy extraction, petrochemical processing zones, saline land 
reclamation projects, and other construction facilities (White Paper, Xinjiang 
Development, China Daily).  
  
Infrastructure projects linking western and eastern China also are positioned to reach far 
beyond China’s western borders: to the frontier markets and emerging markets of 
Eurasia, Middle East, and South Asia.  As of 2009, the creation of nearly 20 Grade-I 
Ports and 12 Grade-II Ports opened China’s western borderlands to a host of disparate 
trading partners: Kazakhstan, Russia, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
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and Afghanistan.  In 2008, Xinjiang’s volume of foreign trade reached 22.217 billion, 
making it second in trade volume among China’s central and western provinces (ibid.). 
With plans on both Xinjiang’s and Kazakhstan’s part to increase trade, in March 2012, 
the Xinjiang Department of Commerce announced sales turnover between Xinjiang and 
its Central Asian neighbor amounting to nearly $11 billion, up over 13% from the 
previous year, with sales turnover targets in 2012 to slated to expand 18%.  Meanwhile, 
Kazakhstan’s Senate announced that trade turnover with China topped $20 billion in 
2011 (BizXinjiang, March 29, 2012).  
    
As China reaches beyond its western frontier into the near abroad, the future of 
successful revival of overland trade -- a latter-day Silk Route -- to augment China’s 
booming Pacific trade, is as yet nascent.   In creating alternate trade corridors to 
Eurasia, South Asia and the Middle East beyond Xinjiang, the Chinese frontier exposes 
itself to a host of multi-national, economic, and institutional actors beyond its western 
frontier: from long-term partners such as Pakistan and large-scale emerging markets of 
India, to failed states such as Afghanistan.  By opening up China’s back door to outside 
influence, China will contend with divergent socio-economic and political interests that 
will create opportunities, even if they complicate the state’s internal integration process.  
Yet, in order to create commercial alternatives beyond the Pacific coast, China is 
ultimately in a better position to create an even economic playing field for its own 
internal constituents, not to mention its economic development-at-large.    
 
By successfully building up business opportunities along its western frontier, China 
more fully equipped to address the larger scope of political and economic challenges 
that face it globally. Beginning with its near-neighbor Kazakhstan, China can test out 
markets and investment strategies in its own backyard.  Whereas Kazakhstan had been 
the ambivalent recipient of Soviet industrial policy along the Russian frontier, now 
China has acquired the resources to invest in large-scale industrial projects benefitting 
both itself and its neighbor.  The Chinese government has gradually acquired the 
largesse and luxury, along with the interest, to develop infrastructure projects and heavy 
industry within and beyond its own borders: namely oil, gas and commodity extraction. 
China can experiment with economic, trade and investment strategies in the near abroad 
(Kazakhstan) before establishing ventures further abroad  (Africa and the Americas). 
 
In the mid-20th century, the China state abandoned Soviet centralizing project of heavy 
industrial investment, concentrating on developing economic diversification based on 
competitive local economies.  Half a century later, China has able to revisit its own 
large-scale strategic industries, simultaneously amplifying investment while promoting 
competition between its own corporate giants in the oil and gas industry.  Having 
succeeded in deploying business-industrial clusters and competitive local economies on 
the eastern seaboard, it is better placed to transpose principles of economic 
diversification and competitive advantage unto the state sector.  At the same time, 
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China is now in a better position to finance and invest in strategic projects across the 
state border, in the near-west (including Kazakhstan) and further abroad.   
 
Transposing Competitive Advantage Unto Strategic Oil and Gas Industry:  From 
Micro-Clusters to Multinationals 
 
If China’s initial western development trajectory was premised to a large extent on 
border containment policies and top-down industrialization, experiments in regional 
competition policy successful in eastern China are being transposed both to the more 
sensitive border regions, as well to high-profile strategic industries. The principles of 
competitive advantage, if conditioned and generated within China’s own context, have 
proved fitting vehicles for international expansion and large-scale industry.  With 
successful experiments of regional competition in the local economies on its own 
eastern seaboard, China is better positioned to take on larger-scale projects involving 
economic diversification with higher degrees of risk and reward, from natural resources 
to international finance.    
 
The central government has encouraged strategic industry giants, namely state oil-and-
gas multinationals, to engage in the competitive practice earlier afforded only small and 
medium businesses.  State oil companies, positioning themselves to be national 
champions in triplicate – China National Oil (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC), and Sinopec -- have increasingly carved out separate domains. 
They readily compete with one another for market share.  At the same time, state 
coffers are behind them, offering support in the case of downturn.   Despite this, 
China’s oil giants hardly resemble the stereotype of moribund monoliths passively 
waiting for government handouts.  Government backing does not seem to compromise 
active competition among the oil giants.  
 
As China’s three largest oil companies grew, they initially pursued strategies grounded 
in territorial or functional advantage. China National Oil concentrated on upstream 
extraction, while CNOOC (China Overseas Oil) focused on offshore development.  Last 
but not least, Sinopec devoted itself to downstream enterprises.   China National Oil 
initially invested in its own western frontier, Xinjiang’s Tarim basin, before expanding 
further afield.   CNOOC established domestic offshore localities in the East China Sea 
and Bohai Bay, before extending corporate reach into overseas destinations in Southeast 
Asia and beyond.   Meanwhile, Sinopec established itself as the arbiter of refinery 
capacity along multiple business and product lines.     
 
Once these competencies were firmly established, these three state companies expanded 
into other domains, to finally begin competing on each other’s turf.   China National 
Oil, after testing out its inland western frontier in Xinjiang province, went head-to-head 
with China Overseas Oil (CNOOC) in a quest for international cross-border ventures 
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and acquisitions. China National Oil established a beachhead in Kazakhstan, financing 
an East-West pipeline to eventually link China’s western interior to the Pacific.  
 
However, expansive strategies between competing Chinese oil giants for international 
influence and oil access did not always proceed smoothly as planned.  In 2005, 
CNOOC, competing with China National Oil for Central Asian oil access, made moves 
to acquire US-based Unocal, which presided over key oil interests in southern Central 
Asia.  After an outcry from US media, public, and government, the Chinese corporation 
reacted quickly, pulling back its large-scale interest in US companies.  In the mid-late 
2000s, CNOOC quickly and quietly reversed strategic course, pursuing lower profile 
deals in the US and Canada.  In the long run, these acquisitions collectively comprised 
great financial and territorial scope, even while attracting much less attention in the US 
media.   By late 2011, numerous M&A deals by CNOOC had taken multiple 33 percent 
stakes in oil properties dispersed and divided up throughout the Midwestern US states.  
 
Meanwhile, China’s neighbor Kazakhstan has become far less dependent on Russia and 
the West by playing the China card for its own strategic interests.    In Kazakhstan 
during the early 1990s, China was seen as seen by the Kazakh populace as backwater 
and country cousin, as compared to elite Russia; China was deemed a cheap purveyor of 
low-quality goods and a bothersome influx of petty traders.    Less than ten years later, 
however, China had become a venerable and reliable source to develop Kazakhstan’s 
own fragmented infrastructure.  In turn, China could become a valuable ally in 
providing an alternative to dependence on Russia and the West for hydrocarbon 
investment.  China’s ability to finance Kazakhstan’s internal infrastructure, creating 
pipelines to link up Kazakhstan’s own oil-resource rich west with its populous east, 
would be a future benefit.  Simultaneously, China’s investment in the logistics of 
Kazakhstan would also satisfy its own large appetite for oil in the process, through 
linking up with China’s internal pipeline infrastructure. 
 
More recently, China and Kazakhstan have pursued other mutually beneficial interests 
as well.   Both China and Kazakhstan have established sovereign wealth funds and 
financial state holding companies, where diversified asset management can move 
beyond faltering Western financial markets to take multiple stakes in emerging market 
industries as well as those of more developed economies, whether through 
commodities, international private equity, real estate, or other growth ventures.  Faced 
with uncertain returns in the West, China and Kazakhstan are increasingly poised to 
evolve separate yet mutually cooperative investment projects to further diversify their 
own state portfolios limited by the constraints of Western-dominated capital markets. 
For instance, China’s financial conglomerate CITIC (China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation) acquired shares of Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund 
Samruk-Kazyna.  
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Such projects of mutual interest will likely continue as the post-transition Asian 
emerging and frontier markets outgrow their limited labels.  As they balance market-
driven opportunity with state-led scenarios, they will continue to experiment with 
diversified trends in capital formation, asset allocation, private equity investment, and 
multi-directional trade and investment strategies that reach along varied corridors of 
global reach. Along with this, both China and Kazakhstan will continue to address the 
long-standing issues of diversification in their own interiors, as they negotiate the 
delicate balancing act between central and local, state and market.  
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Ahrens, J. and Jünemann, P. (2011). ‘Adaptive Efficiency and Pragmatic Flexibility: 
Characteristics of Institutional Change in Capitalism, Chinese-Style’, in Pascha, W., 
Storz, C., and Taube, M. (eds) Institutional Variety in East Asia: Formal and Informal 
Patterns of Coordination, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Allworth, E. (1990). The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, 
A Cultural History. Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, CA.  
 
Amable, B. (2003). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Bell, D. (2012, January 7) ‘What China Can Teach Europe’, The New York Times, 
New York, NY. 
 
Belussi, Fiorenza (2005).  "Industrial Districts/Local Production Systems as 
hypernetworks: a neo-Marshallian interpretive frame", in Marco Enrico Luigi Guidi, 
The Changing Firm, Contributions from the History of Economic Thought. 
 
Bremmer, I. (2010). The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States 
and Corporations?  New York : Portfolio (Penguin Group). 
 
‘China’s Xinjiang, Kazakhstan to Increase Trade in 2012’, (2012), BizXinjiang, 
Tianshannet. Available at http://www.aboutxinjiang.com/Biz/content/2012-
03/29/content_6706137.htm (accessed April 15, 2012). 
 
‘CNOOC, Chesapeake Close Eagle Ford Shale Deal’ (Nov. 16, 2010), Oil & Gas 
Journal. Available at http://www.ogfj.com/articles/2010/11/cnooc_-chesapeake.html 
(accessed April 15, 2012).  
 
21
Eitzen: Dilemmas of Diversification
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2012
DILEMMAS OF DIVERSIFICATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND  
BUSINESS-INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN 
  
 
   
2012   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG   
 
Chronicle of Events: 10 Years of China’s Western Development (Jan. 4, 2010): China 
Development Gateway website. Available at 
http://en.chinagate.cn/features/Western_Development/2010-
01/04/content_19175519.htm (accessed May 20, 2012). 
 
Cummings, S. (2005). Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
‘Diversification of Kazakhstan’s Economy Through Cluster Development in Non-
Extraction Sectors of the Economy’, Embassy of Kazakhstan in Israel website. 
Available at http://www.kazakhemb.org.il/?CategoryID=185&ArticleID=252 (Accessed 
June 2, 2012). 
 
Dezemer, R. (2012). ‘China’s Footprint in U.S. Oil: A State-by-State List’, Wall Street 
Blogs: Deal Journal, Wall Street Journal. Available at  
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/03/06/chinas-footprint-in-us-oil-a-state-by-state-list/ 
(accessed March 6, 2012).  
 
Guidi, Marco Enrico Luigi (2005). The Changing Firm: Contributions from the History 
of Economic Thought: Selected Papers from the 7th Conference of Aispe - 
Associazione Italiana Per la Storia Del Pensiero Economico.  FrancoAngeli, Milan. 
 
Huang, Y. (1994). ‘Information, Bureaucracy, and Economic Reforms in China and the 
Soviet Union’. World Politics, 47, 102-134.  
 
Huang, Y. (2008). Capitalism With Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
‘Invest in Kazakhstan’ website. Available at 
http://www.invest.gov.kz/?option=content&itemid=243 (web sub-site: 
http://invest.gov.kz/?option=content&section=6  (accessed June 2, 2012). 
 
‘Investment Attraction, Special Economic Zone Development, and Export Promotion in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2010-2014’ (2010). Available at 
http://eng.textilezone.kz/preference_of_sez/; 
http://eng.textilezone.kz/how_to_become_partners/ (accessed April 30, 2012). 
 
Joint Ventures: Overview, CITIC Capital Website. Available at 
http://www.citiccapital.com/jv.html (accessed August 1, 2012). 
 
‘Kazakh Cluster Development in the Cards’ (2004, April 8) New Europe Online.  
Available at http://www.neurope.eu/node/83497 (accessed February 20, 2012). 
 
22
Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 4 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jekem/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7885/1946-651X.1087
 DILEMMAS OF DIVERSIFICATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND  
BUSINESS-INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN 
 
 2012   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG 
 
‘Kizilesu Kirgyz Autonomous Prefecture’ (2006), Xinjiang Economy Web Section 
(www.aboutxinjiang.com), BizXinjiang,  Tianshannet. Available at 
http://www.aboutxinjiang.com/Biz/content/2006-06/26/content_2213.htm (accessed 
March 30, 2012).  
 
Krugman, P. (1991). Geography and Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Li, X., Duan, R., and Zhuang,  H. (2010). ‘A Case Study of Tianjin Economic 
Development Area’. In Zeng, D. (ed) Building Engines for Growth and 
Competitiveness in China, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. 
 
Lillis, Joanna. “Kazakhstan: Astana Having Hard Time Escaping Zhanaozen’s 
Shadow,” July 18, 2012. Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65674 (accessed 
August 8, 2012). 
 
 Lillis, Joanna. “Kazakhstan: Thirteen Still Behind Bars After Zhanaozen Appeal,” 
August 6, 2012. Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65754 (accessed August 
8, 2012). 
 
Liu, Alan P.L. (August 1992). The ‘Wenzhou Model’ of Development and China’s 
Modernization, Asian Survey, 32(8), 692-711. 
 
Mao Zedong (1977). Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe. 
 
Meisner, M. (1982). Marxism, Maoism and Utopianism: Eight Essays. Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Millward, J. (2007). Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Montinola, G., Weingast, B., and Qian, Y. (1995). Federalism, Chinese Style: The 
Political Basis for Economic Success in China, World Politics, 48, 50-81. 
 
OECD (2011). Competitiveness and Private Sector Development: Kazakhstan 2010: 
Sector Competitiveness Strategy.  Paris: OECD Publishing.  
 
‘Official Says Xinjiang’s Stability “Fragile”’ (December 24, 2012), China Daily. 
Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-12/24/content_11753154.htm 
(accessed March 30, 2012).  
 
Oi, Jean (1999). Rural Economy Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic 
Reform.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
23
Eitzen: Dilemmas of Diversification
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2012
DILEMMAS OF DIVERSIFICATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND  
BUSINESS-INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN 
  
 
   
2012   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG   
 
O’Neill, Jim.  “Emerging Markets No Longer Emerging but Growing (Market Watch), 
The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2012. Available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/jim-oneill-emerging-markets-no-longer-emerging-
but-growing-2012-04-25 (accessed July 30, 2012). 
 
Parris, Kristen  (June 1993). Local Initiative and National Reform: The Wenzhou Model 
of Development.  The China Quarterly, 134, 242-263. 
 
Pascha, W., Storz, C., and Taube, M. (2011). Institutional Variety in East Asia: Formal 
and Informal Patterns of Coordination, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Pascha, W., Storz, C., and Taube, M. (2011). Coordination Between Inertia and 
Dynamic Development: An Overview of Issues and Contributions. Institutional Variety 
in East Asia: Formal and Informal Patterns of Coordination, Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Porter, M. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Free Press. 
 
Porter, M. (January 26, 2005). “Kazakhstan’s Competitiveness: Roadmap Towards a 
Diversified Economy” (Presentation). Adobe PDF Document, 
Kazakhstan_Competitiveness_2005.01.26; available at http://www.isc.hbs.edu 
(accessed August 8, 2012). 
 
“The Rise of State Capitalism” (Economist Special Report),  The Economist, January 
12, 2012.  Available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543160 (accessed July 30, 
2012). 
 
Rudelson, J. (1998). Oasis Identities:  Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
Rudnitsky, J. (Dec. 20, 2011). ‘Protestors Rally in Kazakh Oil Region After Riots 
Leave 14 Dead”, Bloomberg Businessweek.  Available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-20/protesters-rally-in-kazakh-oil-region-
after-riots-leave-14-dead.html (accessed May 30, 2012). 
 
Sachs, J. and Woo, W. T. (1994). Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, 
Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union, Economic Policy, 9, 101-45.   
 
Shichor, Y. (2004). The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy.  In Starr, F. (ed) 
Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Shih, V. (2009). Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
24
Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 4 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jekem/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7885/1946-651X.1087
 DILEMMAS OF DIVERSIFICATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND  
BUSINESS-INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN 
 
 2012   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG 
 
 
Shue, V. (1990). The Reach of the State: A Sketch of the Chinese Body Politic, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Skinner, W. (November 1964; 1965, February & May 1965). Marketing and Social 
Structure in Rural China, Parts I, II, and III, Journal of Asian Studies, 24, 3-44; 195-
228; 363-99. 
 
Sonobe, T, Dinghuan Hu, D., and Otsuka, K. (July 2004). From Inferior to Superior 
Products: An Inquiry Into the Wenzhou Model of Industrial Development in China, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 542-563.  
 
Starr, F.S. (Ed.)(2004). Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe.  
 
‘Top Regional Official Says Xinjiang’s Stability “Fragile”’ (Dec. 24, 2010) People’s 
Daily. Available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7242098.html  
(accessed July 30, 2012). 
 
Tsai, K. (2007). Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary 
China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
  
Tse, E. (Spring 2010). The China Challenge, Strategy and Business, 58, Booz and Co. 
 
Wang, J. and Hu, M. (2010). From County-Level to State-Level Special Economic 
Zone: The Case of the Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone. In 
Zeng, D. (ed) Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China, Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
  
Wang, J. and Yue, F. (2010). Cluster Development and the Role of Government: The 
Case of Xiqiao Textile Cluster in Guandong, In Zeng, D. (ed) Building Engines for 
Growth and Competitiveness in China. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Wiemer, C. (2004). The Economy of Xinjiang. in Starr, S.F. (ed) Xinjiang: China’s 
Muslim Borderland, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
White Paper on Development and Progress in Xinjiang’, China Daily. Available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/21/content_8717461.htm (china.org.cn 
OPT. updated 2009-09-21) (accessed May 30, 2012). 
 
Wong, E. (2012, February 29) ‘Deadly Clashes Erupt in Western China’, The New 
York Times, New York, NY.  
 
25
Eitzen: Dilemmas of Diversification
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2012
DILEMMAS OF DIVERSIFICATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND  
BUSINESS-INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN 
  
 
   
2012   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG   
 
 
Zeng, D. Z. (2010). Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: 
Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters. Washington, DC: 
World Bank Publications.  
 
Zheng, Y. (2007).  De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-
Local Relations. New Jersey/London/Singapore: World Scientific.  
 
 
 
 
26
Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 4 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jekem/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7885/1946-651X.1087
